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Abstract 
Constructivism has become the overarching scientific paradigm in the social study 
of science and technology (STS). The notion that scientific facts and technological 
artefacts result from processes of social construction is the major scientific innova-
tion of the preceding decades in the sociology of science and technology. With 
constructivism being the established paradigm in this field of research: what comes 
next? What comes after constructivism in science and technology studies? The 
contributions of this special issue of Science, Technology & Innovation Studies 
suggest different answers to these questions which can roughly be subsumed under 
the three headings “Spelling out Constructivism”, “Adding Disregarded Aspects”, 
and “Going beyond Constructivism”. 
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1 Introduction 
Constructivism has become the over-
arching scientific paradigm in the 
social study of science and technology 
(STS). The notion that scientific facts 
and technological artefacts result from 
processes of social construction is the 
major scientific innovation of the 
preceding decades in the sociology of 
science and technology. 
In the field of science studies this 
notion has had the characteristics of a 
revolutionary change. The emerging 
sociology of scientific knowledge was 
no longer content with merely analys-
ing the institutional dimension of 
science as Robert K. Merton (1973) 
did. Its proponents no longer accepted 
the distinction according to which 
scientific truth is to be explained by the 
inner logic and rationality of science 
itself, whereas social influences are 
treated to be “extra-theoretical factors” 
accountable for scientific endeavours 
to go astray. In contrast to such a 
“sociology of error” (Bloor 1976: 8)1 
and in contrast to the Mertonian 
sociology of scientific institutions the 
then new sociology of scientific knowl-
edge claimed that the content of sci-
ence and not only its context should 
become the subject of sociological 
explanation. 
No doubt, this approach in its different 
variants as “Strong Programme” (Bloor 
1976), “Empirical Programme of Rela-
tivism (EPOR)” (Collins 1981; Collins 
1983) or “Laboratory Studies” (La-
tour/Woolgar 1979; Knorr Cetina 
1984) has turned out to be extraordi-
                                                             
1 Bloor (1976: 8) blames Mannheim to have 
based his sociology of knowledge on the 
aforementioned distinction. It is true that 
Mannheim calls social factors “extra-
theoretical factors” (cf. Mannheim 1985 
<1929>: 230). But it is a somewhat biased 
interpretation to conclude from this that 
the Mannheimian “sociology of knowledge 
is confined to the sociology of error” (Bloor 
1976: 8). More rightfully, Bloor might have 
pointed, for example, at Joseph Ben-David 
(cf. Ben-David 1971: 11-13).  
narily successful. A large number of 
empirical studies, were undertaken to 
show that and how scientific facts are 
constructed socially. These studies 
have demonstrated that many of the 
sociologists’ conceptual and methodo-
logical tools for analysing and explain-
ing social processes are also suitable 
for reconstructing and understanding 
the processes of generating scientific 
knowledge. It has been shown that 
scientific controversies are processes of 
social negotiation whose outcomes are 
a function of the interests, strategies 
and coalitions of the parties involved. 
Gaining common acceptance for scien-
tific claims depends on the rhetoric 
skills, allies, and institutional re-
sources (e.g. the already established 
scientific knowledge) the actors are 
able to mobilise. It has been demon-
strated that many of the epistemic 
practices of scientists in their laborato-
ries are similar to our normal everyday 
cultural practices of interpreting and 
understanding the world. Therefore, 
the same ethnographic methods which 
are used to study cultural practices 
turned out to be useful to study the 
epistemic practices of scientists and 
thus their cultural construction of 
scientific knowledge. Many studies 
have applied these basic methodologi-
cal insights and have provided consid-
erable evidence suggesting that social 
construction is a non-negligible aspect 
of scientific knowledge production. 
With a delay of several years, social 
constructivism became adopted by 
technology studies, with Trevor J. 
Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker (1984) 
being the pioneers of this develop-
ment. The core assumption of the then 
new social constructivist sociology of 
technology is that technological arte-
facts are regarded as functional be-
cause they are successful – an assump-
tion that contradicts the traditional 
view that technology is successful 
because of its functionality. From the 
social constructivist point of view, 
functionality is a relational feature, a 
feature a technological artefact gains 
by being seen as an appropriate solu-
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tion to a relevant problem. Thus, 
becoming an appropriate solution to a 
relevant problem – becoming success-
ful – defines the functionality and 
usefulness of technological artefacts. In 
other words: technological artefacts 
are constructed socially. 
Social constructivism in the field of 
technology has never been perceived as 
being as revolutionary as in the field of 
science. It is true that social construc-
tivism is opposed to common assump-
tions about technological functionality. 
And it is opposed to assumptions about 
technological imperatives governing 
paths of technological development. 
However, few people who share these 
assumptions – laymen, engineers or 
students of technological change – 
would disagree with the proposition 
that a technological artefact’s success 
is dependent on its users’ acceptance. 
Thus, social constructivism is less 
controversial in the realm of technol-
ogy than in the realm of science. Tech-
nological artefacts are constructed as 
means to achieve human ends. Only 
those who challenge this basic assump-
tion and believe that technological 
development has become an end in 
itself have reason to reject social con-
structivism in technology studies. 
Nevertheless, applying social construc-
tivism to technology brought about a 
major change. It triggered the devel-
opment of the sociology of technology 
(and the social studies of technology 
respectively) as a distinct field of 
scientific research. Different strands of 
research on technology in historical, 
philosophical or political science, in 
sociology of industry or in innovation 
studies now became recognised and re-
evaluated as contributing to the social 
constructivist approach. Once explic-
itly articulated, the scientific paradigm 
of social construction of technology 
turned out to be a powerful focussing 
device which bundled and combined 
the hitherto fragmented research on 
social processes of technology devel-
opment.  
Twenty years after the initial formula-
tion of the “Social construction of 
technology (SCOT)” as a research 
programme by Pinch and Bijker, we 
can look back to a considerable 
amount of empirical research. Many 
different technologies have been stud-
ied from the point of view of social 
constructivism. Maybe, some of the 
research has put too much weight on 
demonstrating the obvious, namely 
that technology is socially constructed 
(cf. Woolgar 1991: 36; Sismondo 1993: 
543). But at the same time we have 
learned a lot about what is much more 
interesting: how technology is con-
structed socially (cf. Joerges 1995) It 
turned out that the interrelatedness 
between a technology’s context of 
development and its context of use is 
of greatest significance for answering 
this question. Looking back it is thus 
safe to say that social constructivism is 
a successful research programme in 
technology studies, too. 
The “science wars” debate (cf. Bammé 
2004) has shown that social construc-
tivism of science has not jet lost its 
provocative power. But it is provoca-
tive only for those who are doing 
science and not for those who are 
observing doing science.2 For doing 
science, realism (naïve realism, critical 
rationalism, methodological positivism 
or other variants) is the standard 
operational epistemology. For re-
searchers who do science the assump-
tion that they deal with their research 
subject and not “merely” with social 
constructions is to a certain degree as 
inevitable as it is functional. Thus, it 
comes as no surprise that social con-
structivism, while being normal sci-
ence for the scientific observers of 
science, still gives offence to the scien-
tists observed. 
Although less pronounced, a similar 
distinction between practitioners and 
observers can be found in the field of 
                                                             
2 If one leaves aside the more specialised 
critique of postmodernist story-telling 
about science (e.g. the “Sokal hoax”). 
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technology. As the scientist’s, primary 
concern with her research object 
makes her lose sight of the social 
contingencies of the knowledge pro-
duction process, the engineer’s pri-
mary concerned with problems of 
technological feasibility makes him 
neglect the technology’s context of use. 
The “acid test of the market”, however, 
continually reminds him that it is 
ultimately the users whose interpreta-
tions and patterns of use turn his work 
into a successful (or failing) techno-
logical innovation. 
Michael Guggenheimer and Helga 
Nowotny contended that the present 
state of science and technology studies 
is characterised by a “joy of repetition” 
(2003: 231). Even today, much re-
search in science and technology 
studies is designed to demonstrate that 
this scientific truth or that technology 
is constructed socially. In the face of a 
scientific climate that favours the 
realism of the natural sciences rather 
than the constructivism of the social 
sciences, and in the face of an engi-
neering culture with limited attention 
to the social features of technological 
design, the tendency to point out again 
and again what is already sufficiently 
proven is understandable. However, as 
Guggenheimer and Nowotny suggest, 
this repetition might also indicate a 
certain stagnancy of science and tech-
nology studies. 
Fighting past battles – as it happened 
with the “science wars” debate – is not 
a promising future for science and 
technology studies. So what is the 
future of STS? With social constructiv-
ism being the established scientific 
paradigm of the social studies of sci-
ence and technology, what comes next? 
What comes after constructivism in 
science and technology studies? 
We suggest that are three different 
answers to this question: (1) spelling 
out constructivism, (2) adding disre-
garded aspects to constructivism, or 
(3) going beyond constructivism. 
According to Thomas Kuhn (1962), the 
establishment of a new scientific 
paradigm is followed by a phase of 
“normal science”. Normal science 
means to implement in research prac-
tice what the paradigm at first merely 
promises, to concretise what is initially 
a general idea, and to deal with the 
paradigm’s implications, many of 
which are unrecognised in the begin-
ning. ‘Normal science’ thus means to 
spell out the new approach.  
A second characteristic of a new para-
digmatic approach – besides being 
little more than a rough idea initially – 
is its tendency to be excluding and 
unfair against antecedent or rivalling 
approaches. Since proponents are 
interested to highlight the originality 
and superiority of the new approach 
they tend to downplay all the achieve-
ments that different approaches have 
already contributed or may contribute 
in the future. A good example of this 
rhetoric strategy is Bloor’s somewhat 
pejorative characterisation of Mann-
heim’s approach as a “sociology of 
error”. Once the new scientific para-
digm is established, these over-
accentuated demarcations become less 
important. This opens up the opportu-
nity to look for aspects in which the 
new approach and its predecessors or 
rivals complement each other rather 
than holding competing views. For 
instance, after studying the very con-
tent of science has become an estab-
lished approach, there is little reason 
why studying the institutional context 
of science should be seen as a compet-
ing rather than as a complementary 
area of research in the social studies of 
science (cf. Schimank 1995). Seeing 
constructivism as firmly established, 
the second answer to “What is the 
future of constructivism in STS?” is 
that now it is time to add disregarded 
aspects of this kind. 
However, it may turn out that research 
governed by a paradigmatic scientific 
approach comes to face problems that 
can neither be solved by spelling out 
the approach nor by adding disre-
garded aspects. Such anomalies, if they 
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are important enough and if a new 
paradigm is put forward with a plausi-
ble promise to solve these problems, 
may, according to Kuhn, lead to a new 
revolutionary situation and to the 
displacement of the established ap-
proach by a new one. In the case of 
constructivism, we see two problems 
that may have such a paradigm-
changing quality: the reflexivity prob-
lem (“if scientific propositions are 
social constructions, then this holds for 
this proposition, too”) and the problem 
of material agency. And there is at least 
one prominent scientific approach – 
actor-network theory – which claims to 
be a new scientific paradigm, to go 
beyond (and not behind) constructiv-
ism and to be able to solve both prob-
lems. The third answer, thus, is that 
the days of constructivism in STS are 
numbered and that postconstructivist 
or “posthumanist” (cf. Pickering 2005) 
approaches such as actor-network 
theory will take over. 
It should be added that the distinctions 
between these three paths of construc-
tivism’s future are less sharp than the 
application of the Kuhnian terminol-
ogy makes it sound. For instance, 
actor-network theory and other post-
constructivist approaches are deeply 
rooted within constructivism so that 
one could argue that they are forms of 
spelling out implications of construc-
tivism rather than new paradigmatic 
approaches. Nevertheless, it does not 
seem to be completely misleading to 
subsume the answers given by the 
authors of this special issue of the 
Science, Technology & Innovation 
Studies under the three headings 
“Spelling out Constructivism”, “Adding 
Disregarded Aspects”, and “Going 
beyond Constructivism”.3 
                                                             
3 Preliminary versions of this special issue’s 
papers were presented at the Annual 
Conference 2004 of the German Associa-
tion for Science and Technology Studies 
(Gesellschaft für Wissenschafts- und 
Technikforschung e.V.) in Berlin, Nov 26-
27.  
2 Spelling out Constructivism 
In her article “The Topicality of the 
Difference Thesis: Revisiting Construc-
tivism and the Laboratory”, Martina 
Merz begins with the observation that 
constructivist STS never has been a 
monolithic endeavour, but from the 
very beginning existed in two variants. 
Although these two variants share 
basic conceptual assumptions and 
research issues, they differ strongly 
when it comes to the question of ex-
tending the foci and loci of STS re-
search, especially when moving beyond 
the walls of the laboratory. According 
to the first variant of constructivist STS 
(termed the analogy approach), there 
are no epistemic particularities of 
knowledge production in the labora-
tory. Although an important corner-
stone of STS, this variant is limited to 
examining and showing the locally 
constructed and negotiated character 
of facts and artefacts – issues that 
cannot be considered as challenges 
today. The second variant (termed the 
difference approach) states that there 
is something specific about the scien-
tific laboratory: The power to reconfig-
ure subject-object-relations, and this 
power is stronger than within any 
other social organisation, and can 
explain the success of the laboratory in 
modernity.  
Focussing on the continuing topicality 
of the difference approach can, accord-
ing to Martina Merz, lead to a whole 
research programme that can be sum-
marised as “transcending” versus 
“extending the laboratory”, both of 
which have not been spelled out within 
the constructivist approach. “Tran-
scending” the laboratory asks how 
results that were locally produced in 
the lab can be successfully exported or 
transferred to other settings. Concrete 
questions on this line of research could 
be e.g. to investigate the conditions of 
the transferability of scientific results, 
thereby explaining its power in more 
depth, or to explore more systemati-
cally the epistemic practices that 
account for the disembedding and the 
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re-embedding of objects and results. 
“Extending” the laboratory raises the 
question whether laboratory-like 
features of knowledge production can 
be identified in other societal realms, 
like e.g. in the practices of object 
reconfiguration in interdisciplinary 
research areas like computer simula-
tion and environmental sciences. 
While still being in the line of con-
structivist STS, all of the questions 
raised in the article of Martina Merz 
can give way to a more concrete explo-
ration of the issues related to the 
notion of the knowledge society. 
With their article “Three Forms of 
Interpretative Flexibility”, Uli Meyer 
and Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer subject one 
of the core concepts of constructivism 
– interpretative flexibility – to a sys-
tematic analysis that leads to a signifi-
cant extension of the concept. The 
authors demonstrate that there are 
three rather than one form of interpre-
tative flexibility, and that each of them 
is based on a specific regress of argu-
ments in science. They adopt the work 
on the interpretative flexibility of 
scientific statements and the regress of 
truth (H. Collins). Meyer and Schulz-
Schaeffer then analyse the approach to 
technological controversies of the 
“Social Construction of Technology 
(SCOT)” programme (Pinch and Bi-
jker). They observe that this approach 
is far less convincing because it copied 
the concepts from science studies and 
overlooked that technological contro-
versies deal with a different kind of 
interpretive flexibility, which is based 
on a regress of usefulness. In a third 
step, the authors use an empirical 
investigation of the controversy about 
neural networks to introduce a third 
and new type of interpretative flexibil-
ity that can be distinguished from the 
two others. This controversy addresses 
neither truth nor usefulness. The 
interpretative flexibility of statements 
about the potential of scientific or 
technological approaches is based on a 
regress of relevance: Which approach 
will best advance the scientific or 
technological development?  
Having introduced three distinct forms 
of interpretive flexibility, the authors 
demonstrate the usefulness of their 
distinction by discussing switches of 
controversies. They identify a switch 
from the truth discourse to a relevance 
discourse in the controversy about 
gravitational waves, a switch from the 
usefulness discourse to a truth dis-
course in the controversy about bicy-
cles, and a supplementation of the 
relevance discourse by a usefulness 
discourse in the controversy about 
neural networks. By demonstrating 
that all three forms of interpretative 
flexibility can and indeed do occur in 
scientific and technological controver-
sies, they provide a powerful tool for 
the analysis of scientific controversies. 
3 Adding Disregarded As-
pects 
In his article “Deliberative Constructiv-
ism” Wolfgang Krohn deals with the 
question: “How can we, as scientific 
observers of scientific enterprises, 
distinguish between good and bad 
constructions of knowledge?“ (p. 42) 
Obviously, in knowledge societies this 
is a question of considerable relevance. 
But it seems to be a question that is 
impossible to answer from a construc-
tivist point of view. If scientific knowl-
edge is the result of a process of social 
construction, so are the criteria for the 
assessment of its quality. These criteria 
are thus shaped by interests, preju-
dices, status, values, and world views 
and cannot be used by a scientific 
observer to distinguish between good 
and bad constructions. At the same 
time, however, constructivism invites 
the observer to take a normative 
stance: “precisely because our methods 
and concepts in the production of 
knowledge and the justification of 
truth claims are culture bound, their 
relatedness can not only be observed 
but also controlled and adjusted – at 
least to some degree.” (p. 43) This is, 
then, the dilemma of constructivism in 
the sociology of science: on the one 
hand, it shows that scientific knowl-
Schulz-Schaeffer/Böschen/Gläser/Meister/Strübing: Introduction 7 
 
edge is manmade, meaning that the 
criteria of good science can be estab-
lished deliberatively; on the other 
hand, however, it deconstructs truth as 
the scientific criterion for good (or 
bad) knowledge.  
Wolfgang Krohn proposes a construc-
tivist solution to this dilemma which 
he calls “deliberative constructivism”. 
His main argument is a dialectical one: 
“Any attempt to determine the limiting 
conditions of a culture provides al-
ready cognitive options for transgress-
ing the limits. … From the impossibil-
ity of a ‘perfect’ translation it does not 
follow that it is impossible to distin-
guish between better or worse transla-
tions. Instead, the better the limiting 
conditions of both languages are 
known, the fairer can the search for an 
improved translation be guided includ-
ing options for slightly changing cer-
tain language features. A similar ar-
gument holds for the justification of 
truth claims.” (p. 54) If one observes 
specific dependencies of scientific 
knowledge on certain social or cultural 
conditions one can use this knowledge 
as a guide for reducing these depend-
encies. This is the basic idea of delib-
erative constructivism. From this point 
of view, “reconstruction of the relativ-
ity of knowledge is a potential contri-
bution to expand its irrelativity” (p. 
56). 
4 Going beyond Constructiv-
ism 
Actor-network theory (ANT) and 
constructivism in STS are roughly of 
the same age, thus there is good reason 
to evaluate actor-network theory with 
as much scrutiny as the former. This is 
even more so since both ANT and 
constructivism departed from largely 
the same sharp critique of the under-
standing of science and technology as 
it was established in the social sciences 
until the late 1970s. Though both 
approaches share their point of depar-
ture most of us would hesitate to call 
ANT a constructivism proper. In pur-
suing the common goal of “opening up 
the black box”, ANT created its own 
very special approach and vocabulary, 
often also addressed as “symmetric 
anthropology”. 
Instead of systematically evaluating 
the theoretical perspective established 
by Michel Callon, Bruno Latour, John 
Law, and others, Thomas Berker in his 
contribution “The Politics of ‘Actor-
Network Theory’. What Can ‘Actor-
Network Theory’ Do to Make Buildings 
More Energy Efficient?” undertakes it 
to confront ANT with a proof of its 
usefulness by re-analysing its virtues in 
an empirical project in technology 
development, while at the same time 
following the line of critical comments 
and discussions developing the ANT 
approach further on. In doing so he 
employs two different images of ANT, 
or shall we say: perspectives, that is, 
“ANT in the making” and “ANT as a 
tool, which can be applied to under-
stand the world”. His core argument is 
that in order to get the best out of ANT 
for analytical purposes it is mandatory 
not to “privilege either the applications 
of ‘ANT’ or ‘ANT in the making’”. He, 
thus, pleas for refraining from re-
establishing a false dualism of on the 
one hand the tool character of a black 
boxed ANT in an application perspec-
tive and on the other hand the open-
ended process of theoretical advance-
ment of ANT. Obviously this is in itself 
an ANT-based argument deeply rooted 
in the anti-dualistic concerns of the 
ANT’s founding fathers. 
Peter Wehling in his article “The 
Situated Materiality of Scientific Prac-
tices: Postconstructivism – a New 
Theoretical Perspective in Science 
Studies” focuses on a line of debate 
which is occasionally labelled as post-
contructivist studies. He combines it 
with one of the most relevant perspec-
tives in the current debate of a sociol-
ogy of scientific knowledge: the debate 
about forms and consequences of 
scientific non-knowledge. His thesis is 
that the fruitfulness of postconstructiv-
ism and its attention for the situated 
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material and discursive practices could 
be demonstrated with respect to the 
debate of non-knowledge: “no less than 
knowledge, non-knowledge is embed-
ded and inscribed in practices con-
ceived as material reconfigurations of 
the world.” (p. 94)  
To demonstrate this, Peter Wehling 
firstly sketches the history of the 
postconstructivist debate. In the course 
of this argumentation he outlines the 
insight of SSK that beyond of “bringing 
back in” material factors a self-
reflective notion as to basic assump-
tions of SSK emerged. With respect to 
this result he argues secondly that the 
self-reflective turn could be demon-
strated with regard to three key con-
cepts: knowledge, practice and per-
formativity. To establish another 
concept of knowledge he refers to the 
works of Joseph Rouse and his idea of 
a “deflationary” and “non-reifying” 
concept of knowledge. Following 
Rouse, he regards practices not pri-
marily as “doings of social actors”. 
Moreover, “an adequate conception of 
(scientific) practices has to encompass 
the material ‘configuration of the 
world’ (Rouse) which makes the activi-
ties of individual or collective agents 
become significant, coherent and 
intelligible.” (p. 89) Additionally, he 
maps the idea of the performativity of 
scientific practices – against a “tradi-
tional” representationalist approach of 
science. Thirdly, Wehling shows the 
embeddedness of scientific non-
knowledge with respect to general 
concepts (such as the concept of “epis-
temic cultures” of Karin Knorr Cetina, 
which could be extended to a concept 
of “scientific cultures of non-
knowledge”) and the debate on geneti-
cally modified organisms. He notices 
that the perspective offered could be 
fruitful “for initiating more self-
reflective research practices, especially 
when such contrasting scientific cul-
tures of non-knowledge [as in the field 
of genetically modified organisms, the 
molecular biologist and ecologist; the 
editors] are confronted with each other 
in public arenas” (p. 95). 
5 Outlook 
The contributions of this special issue 
on the question “What comes after 
constructivism in science and technol-
ogy studies?” suggest that the con-
structivist approach is still a vivid 
source of inspiration in this field of 
research. Even the postconstructivist 
considerations are far from leaving the 
constructivist foundations behind. 
There is still a lot of work to do in 
order to spell out implications of the 
constructivist approach. At the same 
time, constructivism in STS now seems 
to be mature enough to ease initial 
cognitive restrictions, to broaden its 
scope, and to take considerations into 
account which complement the own 
point of view. In all these directions of 
considering the future of constructiv-
ism in science and technology studies 
much more is to be said than this 
special issue can cover. However, we 
hope it will serve as an impulse to re-
examine the constructivist foundations 
on which much of our work is based. 
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